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United Brands Company v. Commission of the
European Communities: Window to Price
Discrimination Law in the European Economic
Community
Enterprises operating within the European Economic Community'
have long faced the difficult task of ascertaining whether they are sub-
ject to the price discrimination restrictions of the Treaty of Rome.2 The
difficulty stems from the ambiguity present in the Treaty provisions
and is exacerbated by the lack of authoritative interpretation of their
restrictions.3 However, a recent opinion of the European Communi-
ties' Court of Justice,4 United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European
Communities,5 has brought the contours of the price discrimination
prohibition into sharper focus. Although a year has passed since the
opinion was handed down, the Court's decision in United Brands re-
I The European Economic Community (EEC) is a supranational institution created by the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty), entered in force Jan. 1,
1958, 298 U.N.T.S. II. The EEC originally consisted of six countries: Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. On January 1, 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom became members. See Treaty of Accession to the European Economic Com-
munity, done Jan. 22, 1972, art. 2, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73) 5 (1972).
2 Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, arts. 85(l)(d) & 86(c), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49.
Price discrimination is usually thought to be the practice of selling similar units of output at
different prices not related to differences in costs. The practice is regarded as a means by which
the monopolistic seller is able to increase his own short run profits above the level attainable by a
policy of uniform pricing in given demand conditions. K. GEORGE & C. JOLL, COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE U.K. AND THE EEC 152 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GEORGE & JOLL]. The price
discrimination prohibitions of the Rome Treaty, however, are phrased in terms of "dissimilar"
prices. In the United States, the Supreme Court has construed price differentiation as synony-
mous with price discrimination. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
3 The only two prior cases of illegal price discrimination were Codperatieve vereniging
'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission of the European Communities (Sugar Cartel), [1975] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1663, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 295 (1975), and Re GEMA (Gesellschaft fur musikalische
Auffiihrungs- und mechanische Vervielfaltigungsrechte), 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 134) 15, 10
Comm. Mkt. L.R. D35 (R.P. Supp.), application for stay granted in part, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 791, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 694 (1971), modified, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 166) 24 (1972),
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D 115 (R.P. Supp. 1972). In Sugar Cartel, the Court held that an undertak-
ing amounting to eighty-five percent of the Belgian sugar market had abused its dominant posi-
tion by offering a rebate to customers who bought exclusively from the cartel. GEALA involved a
West German musical copyright business enjoying a monopoly in its own country. The Commis-
sion of the European Communities found that GEMA had engaged in practices which discrimi-
nated against nationals of other members of the Common Market.
4 The Court of Justice of the European Communities acts as the ultimate reviewing body of
rulings by the Commission of the European Communities. The Commission, which is the general
executive authority of the European Economic Community, has a function similar to the United
States Federal Trade Commission in trade matters and is the guiding force in the development of
antitrust policy in the European Economic Community. See Swan, The EEC United Brands Deci-
sion." Can Chiquita Banana Find Happiness in Europe?, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 385, 386 (1977).
5 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978).
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mains the fundamental interpretation of price discrimination law under
the Rome Treaty. Despite some ambiguity, the Court's explanation
clarified many of the issues raised in a price discrimination charge.
The Court's boldest interpretive stroke was its determination that a
single enterprise with a market share of less than forty-five percent oc-
cupied a position of dominance in the market. Prior to the United
Brands case, neither the Commission nor the Court of the European
Communities had found any enterprise with a market share of less than
seventy percent to be in a dominant position.6 The significance of this
more inclusive definition of dominance for firms operating within the
Community is far reaching. Formerly, the discrimination provisions of
the EEC competition laws7 appeared to reach only price discrimination
practiced by firms with very large market shares8 and by anticompeti-
tive business combinations. 9 After United Brands, all firms operating
within the EEC are on notice that their pricing practices are subject to
the Community laws against price discrimination. In view of the laws'
broadened reach, the significance of the Community's policy on price
discrimination is correspondingly increased, and each element of the
Community's price discrimination prohibition assumes new impor-
tance to firms operating within the EEC. The opinion, therefore, merits
6 Note, 11 TEx. INT' L.J. 329, 336 (1976).
7 The competition laws of the European Economic Community are embodied in articles 85-
90 of the Rome Treaty. Article 85 is strikingly similar to § 1 of the United States Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Article 86 resembles § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976),
but differs in that article 86 is not directed at the achievement of market power but only its abuse.
8 The prohibition in article 86 applies to firms in a dominant position. In its pertinent parts,
article 86 provides:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby, action
by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the
Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with
the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage ....
Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, art. 86(c), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48-49.
9 The prohibition in article 85 is applicable to all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and other concerted practices. The text of article 85 relating to
price discrimination provides:
I. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall
hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of
enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member
States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. . ..
Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, art. 85(l)(d), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48.
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close scrutiny by business advisers and by students of Common Market
competition laws.
This note examines the components of a price discrimination vio-
lation as they were developed in the United Brands case and identifies
lines of future development suggested by the decision. In particular,
the United Brands decision refined the elements of a price discrimina-
tion violation-dominant position, abusive practice, and competitive
injury-in the following ways. In its discussion of dominance, the
opinion suggests that firms which successfully engage in price discrimi-
nation, regardless of market share, risk attack under the Rome Treaty.
The decision also indicates that a dominant firm's price differentials
which can be justified by differences in the seller's costs and risks will
not be considered illegal. Finally, the decision demonstrates that possi-
ble competitive injury will suffice to establish a violation when the pric-
ing practices in question produce market segmentation along national
borders.
The Community's concern with discriminatory pricing predates
the establishment of the EEC in 1957.10 Because charging different
prices for equivalent transactions was judged detrimental to trade be-
tween the Member States when the party discriminated against suffered
competitive disadvantage, such practices were proscribed in articles 85
and 86 of the Rome Treaty.I' The provisions do not prohibit price
discrimination by every person, however. Article 85(l)(d) prohibits
discriminatory practices pursuant to an agreement between enterprises,
while article 86(c) forbids such practices by a firm in a dominant posi-
tion. Considered together, the provisions appear to allow single sellers
who do not command market shares traditionally synonymous with
dominance to charge dissimilar prices.12
10 The treaty which created the European Coal and Steel Community includes a provision
against price discrimination similar to those contained in the Rome Treaty. Compare Treaty In-
stituting the European Coal and Steel Community, entered in force July 23, 1952, art. 60, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, 189-91, with Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, arts. 85(l)(d) & 86(c), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49.
11 The "price discrimination" provisions of article 86 clearly cover only those affecting compe-
tition at the buyer level. R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 244
(1972). This note will focus on the Community's actions toward discriminatory practices which
affect secondary-line competition. However, classic monopolistic price discrimination aimed at
putting competitors at a disadvantage would appear to constitute an abuse of "imposing unfair
selling prices under Article 86(a)" and are therefore prohibited if trade between member states is
affected. GEORGE & JOLL, supra note 2, at 161.
12 This, at least, appears to have been the conventional interpretation of these provisions:
The prohibition against discrimination applies only to agreements, decisions and prac-
tices within the meaning of. . . article [85], but not to the conduct of the individual enter-
prises. Accordingly, an enterprise may sell at different prices to its customers, but may not
enter into horizontal or vertical agreements on boycott, exclusivity, etc.
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Few cases involving discriminatory practices have come before the
Commission or the Court. While some interpretive comment has fo-
cused on bilateral agreements in contravention of article 85,13 the con-
tours of the article 86(c) prohibition against price discrimination have
hardly been explored. 14 Long before United Brands the Commission
had indicated its intention to apply article 86 to situations where an
enterprise occupying a dominant position abuses its position in a way
that may affect trade between the Member States,'5 but each element of
an article 86(c) violation remained largely uninterpreted.' 6
It was against this background of uncertainty that the Court con-
fronted the price discrimination issue in United Brands. The Commis-
sion had found that United Brands, a multinational conglomerate and
the world's largest banana trader,' 7 had engaged in a practice of selling
bananas to European wholesalers at dissimilar prices.' 8 The price to
each middleman was derived by United Brands from a formula based
on the projected retail price of the product in the country of destina-
tion.' 9 In upholding the Commission decision on price discrimination,
I COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 2021.43. For a similar analysis of these provisions, see A. CROTTI,
TRADING UNDER EEC AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 190 (1977).
13 See, e.g., 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
85.07-.09 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SMIT & HERZOG].
14 See note 3 supra.
15 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, CONCENTRATION OF ENTER-
PRISES IN THE COMMON MARKET $ 62 (1965), translated in COMM. MKT. REPORTS (CCH) No. 26,
pt. 1 (1966).
16 Since the early 1970's there have been several cases fleshing out the requirements of article
86 violations. See Swan, supra note 4. None of these cases, however, carefully analyzes the re-
quirements of price discrimination abuses.
17 The United Brands Company was formed in 1970 by the merger of the United Fruit Com-
pany and the American Seal-Kap Corporation, a major meat producer in the United States.
United Brands accounted for thirty-five percent of world banana exports in 1974. The company
operates in the EEC through its subsidiary, United Brands Continental BV. See Commission
Decision of 17 December 1975 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, 19
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1,2, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R.'D28, D32 (R.P. Supp.), applicationfor stay
granted sub noa. United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, [1976] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 425, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 147 (1976), modiffed, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429
(1978).
18 The Commission also found that United Brands had abused its dominant position by
prohibiting its distributor/ripeners from reselling green UBC bananas, by refusing to supply ba-
nanas to a long-time customer for two years, and by charging excessive prices for its bananas in
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. Id at 19, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D59.
19 The pricing procedure utilized by the United Brands Company began with the distribu-
tor/ripener sending orders to the company for Chiquita-branded bananas the Monday of the
week preceeding the delivery of the bananas. On Tuesday or Wednesday, United Brands con-
firmed the orders as well as the weekly quota allocated to the individual purchasers based on the
orders received compared to the number of bananas on the ship. The actual selling price was only
fixed and announced to the customer four days before the arrival of the ship. Prior to the price
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the Court found that the sum of competitive advantages enjoyed by
United Brands assured the company a position of dominance in the
relevant market. One advantage the company enjoyed was its market
share of approximately forty-five percent in the relevant geographic
and product markets.20 The Court emphasized, however, that market
dominance was not measured solely by market share. It cited other
factors which contributed to its finding of a dominant position. The
company's vertically integrated structure, technical expertise and prod-
uct differentiation were all regarded as indicia of a dominant posi-
tion.2 ' The Court further recognized the enormous capital outlay
necessary to achieve parity with United Brands as a formidable barrier
to entry into the banana trade.2 2 In addition, the Court acknowledged
the potential relevance of a firm's course of discriminatory conduct to a
determination that the firm holds a dominant position.2 3 It is this sug-
gestion-that the discriminatory behavior itself might be evidence of a
dominant position-which may have the most impact on the pricing
policies of firms operating within the EEC.2 4 When the Court suggests
that an ability to engage in long-term price discrimination shows -domi-
nance in the market, it is recognizing that only an enterprise with con-
siderable market power25 can successfully charge different prices for
the same commodity.26 The ability to successfully charge discrimina-
announcement, agents of United Brands calculated the price to be charged based on market con-
ditions in the buyer's nation. After the prices were set the distributors/ripeners had the option of
cancelling or reducing their orders. Id at 5, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D36.
20 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 490.
21 Id at 487-88.
22 Id at 490-91.
23 The Court held that "[in order to find out whether UBC is an undertaking in a dominant
position ... it may be advisable to take account if need be of the facts put forward as acts
amounting to abuses without necessarily having to acknowledge that they are abuses." Id at 487.
"In other words, behavior can be evidence of dominance." Address by John Temple Lang, Ford-
ham Corporate Law Institute (Nov. 14, 1978). Lang is Legal Advisor, Legal Service for the Com-
mission of the European Economic Community.
24 See Lang, supra note 23, who believes "that behavioral evidence of dominance may become
as important in the future in appropriate cases as the features of the allegedly dominant firm and
the extent of competition."
25 Market dominance is defined in United Brand as "a position of economic strength enjoyed
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the rele-
vant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
petitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers." 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 486-87. In deciding
whether the United Brands Company held a dominant position, the Court followed the Commis-
sion decision, which in turn closely adhered to the guidelines established in Europemballage Corp.
v. Commission ofthe European Communities, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 199 (1973). Interestingly, except for its language defining dominant position, the Court did
not significantly rely on prior article 86 decisions in deciding United Brands. In fact, the Court did
not cite a single case in the decision portion of its opinion.
26 This speaks only to those situations in which the seller initiates the discriminatory practice.
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tory prices suggests that the seller practicing discrimination has some
control over the marketing system which it is able to impose upon com-
petition. Under completely effective competition, the presence of other
producers in the market selling the same product removes the ability of
the discriminator to continue to sell goods to some at a higher price.27
According to the Court, the ability of an enterprise to exercise such
control over the market shows that the enterprise occupies a dominant
position.28 Under the United Brands analysis, the long term existence
of a successful price discrimination practice tends to signal an abuse of
a dominant position. However, a seller with a small market share
which is able to charge dissimilar prices because the customer paying
the higher price is unaware of a lower price or is unwilling to take
advantage of it for some reason would not occupy a dominant posi-
tion.29 In all likelihood, such a seller will prevail only in the short run
because it is presumably operating in competition. It is probable that
the customer paying the price will eventually be lured away by a com-
petitor of the price discriminator. 30
If market dominance may be shown by citing a course of success-
ful price discrimination, the restriction on discriminatory pricing
reaches a larger class of business than was previously recognized. Thus
read, the breadth of the United Brands prohibition moves closer to a
general prohibition of discriminatory pricing, such as that contained in
the United States Robinson-Patman Act. 3' Admittedly the Court in
United Brands was not required to adopt such a broad holding; United
Brands' dominance was not demonstrated solely by its ability to engage
in price discrimination.3 2 Furthermore, the drafters of the Rome
Treaty may not have intended such a broad injunction against price
discrimination. Indeed, some commentators assert that a general pro-
Often large purchasers attempt to procure discount terms from small sellers. In these cases the
market power is in the buyer rather than the seller.
27 "[P]rice discrimination is a symptom of market imperfection. If competition is completely
effective, price discrimination will not persist." GEOROE & JOLL, supra note 2, at 152.
28 See 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 486-87.
29 But if his activity affected markets in the United States, such a seller would be violating the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1976), which prohibits any seller from charg-
ing dissimilar prices.
30 Assuming a competitive market, other sellers would enter the market to gain some of the
abnormal profits being reaped by the discriminator.
31 The Robinson-Patman Act makes it "unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . . to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Even read broadly, the price discrimination prohibition con-
tained in article 86(c) of the Rome Treaty is still narrower than that contained in the Robinson-
Patman Act.
32 See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
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hibition was explicitly rejected when the Treaty of Rome was drafted
because the drafters sought to preserve the price elasticity necessary for
real competition.33 On the other hand, a broad reading of article 86
may be essential to fully protect the intended beneficiaries of the law. 34
This is especially so if the ability to effectively discriminate actually
reflects the ability to place others at a competitive disadvantage, as the
Court in United Brands assumed.
One concrete indication of the EEC policy toward discriminatory
pricing evident in the United Brands decision is that dominance plus
differential pricing does not automatically equal an abuse of domi-
nance. Read literally, the language of 86(c) would seem to prohibit any
price differentiation. Nevertheless, the Court in United Brands dis-
played a receptiveness toward cost and risk justifications for price dif-
ferentials. 35 Before finding United Brands' practices in violation of
article 86, the Court considered the company's costs of supplying its
customers. United Brands' Europe-bound bananas were unloaded in
two main ports. The unloading charges in the two ports differed by
only a few U.S. cents per box. The conditions and terms of each sale
were essentially the same. The costs of transportation and customs du-
ties were borne by the buyers, not United Brands. In viewing these
facts, the price discrepancies could not be attributed to disparities in the
cost of doing business.
United Brands' contention that it was entitled to price its product
in a manner responsive to the banana consumption patterns of each
national market was also considered. The Court did not object to the
principle of charging what the market will bear, provided the seller
complied with the Treaty of Rome,36 but soundly rejected profit max-
33 A general prohibition of discrimination was intentionally omitted from these treaty provi-
sions because it would jeopardize the elasticity of prices which is necessary for real competition. It
is also unnecessary for the creation of a "common market," as is shown by the fact that there is as
yet no such general prohibition in any of the Member States. 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2021.43. An American commentator has also acknowledged an incompatibility between rigid re-
strictions on competitive pricing and the antitrust objective of price flexibility. F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 547 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE].
34 Article 86(c) expresses the Community's concern with the competitive injury which accrues
to the disfavored customer in situations involving price discrimination. See note 11 suprar, JOLIET,
supra note 11, at 244-45.
35 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 500. Even before United Brands several commentators speculated
that the Court and Commission would permit differences which are economically justified. SMIT
& HERZOG, supra note 13, at [ 86.18. See, e.g., JOLIET, supra note 11, at 244-45 (meeting the
competition and the cost and risk related to creditworthiness); C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEISS & M.
HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 217 (1963) (functional level of the customer, the size
of his stock, and the bad reputation of the customer which is detrimental to the goodwill of the
product or manufacturer).
36 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 500.
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imization as an acceptable justification for price discrimination. 37 This
rejection contrasted sharply with the Court's willingness to hear cost
and risk justifications.
The Rome Treaty seems to indicate that two additional require-
ments are necessary for an article 86(c) violation. First, price discrimi-
nation must place certain customers at a competitive disadvantage.38
Second, the price discrimination must be capable of affecting trade
within the Common Market.39 Therefore, the Treaty suggests that a
difference in terms is only abusive if it places certain customers at a
competitive disadvantage and violates article 86 only if an effect on
trade between member states may result. In contrast, the United
Brands Court seems to say that price discrimination by a firm in a
dominant position is abusive when it may place some customers at a
competitive disadvantage. The decision also contains a strong indica-
tion that the Court will dispense with an inquiry into the effect on trade
in cases where the price differentials are drawn along national bounda-
ries.
The United Brands Court mentioned no evidence regarding effect.
In fact, after noting the rigid partitioning of national markets and con-
cluding that certain of United Brands' customers were placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage, the Court ended its discussion of the
discriminatory practices without mentioning any effect on trade.40 The
Commission, on the other hand, speculated that United Brands' prac-
tices were likely to have some effect on import and export trade be-
tween the Member States.4 1 In finding a violation without investigating
the effects of the pricing policy, the Court appeared to presume that
abusive price discrimination, when practiced by dominant firms, hin-
ders trade within the Community. A like presumption may be found in
past decisions of the Court.42 If a firm must first be in a dominant
37 Id at 501.
38 The text of article 86(c) is reprinted at note 8 supra.
39 Id
40 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 498-501.
41 The Commission had reasoned that:
[t]he application in respect of sales of Chiquita bananas of dissimilar prices for equivalent
transactions according to the Member State in which the customer operates and the bananas
are to be sold, is liable to encourage or discourage the export of those bananas from one
Member State to another according to the different price levels in the various Member States.
Commission Decision of 17 December 1975 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1, 17, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D28, D55 (R.P. Supp.), appli-
cation for stay granted sub non, United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 425, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 147 (1976), modfied, 21 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 429 (1978).
42 See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon Gesellshaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmbirkte GmbH,
[1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631 (1971). But cf. Groupement des
fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique v. Commission of the European Communities, [19751 E.
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position and potential market effect is implied from dominance, it fol-
lows that a failure to establish an effect on trade is inconsequential once
an abuse is established. 43 However, as previously mentioned, there is
no abuse under 86(c) unless the discriminatory practices impose a com-
petitive disadvantage upon certain customers. 44 Nevertheless, the
United Brands Court assumed competitive injury at the buyer level. Its
assumption of competitive injury from market dominance seems to re-
sult in a broader restriction on pricing practices than is embodied in
article 86(c). Price discrimination only affects competition at the buyer
level when a buyer charged a higher price suffers a loss of business
because its potential customers can purchase from another supplier at a
lower cost. Thus, a competitive disadvantage results only if the enter-
prise receiving a lower price is capable of being a competitor. In United
Brands, the Court presumably concluded that certain customers suf-
fered competitive disadvantages from the evidence that some wholesal-
ers had competed before United Brands instituted its differential
pricing policy.45 Once it is established that a seller's customers are in
competition, it is obvious that the discriminatory practices put certain
customers at a competitive disadvantage.46 The United Brands deci-
sion additionally suggests the Court's willingness to find a competitive
injury from evidence that the customers would be capable of competing
if the price differentials were removed.47 From this conclusion it ap-
pears that the Court is including in its definition of competitive disad-
vantage potential foreclosure from a market. Defining competitive
disadvantage in this way does not conflict with the rationale for requir-
ing a competitive injury to be shown. The reason for demanding a
showing of competitive harm is to avoid unnecessary restrictions on
price flexibility. 48 If no showing were required, a dominant firm would
not be able to charge different prices to different customers. Once the
Court determined that the banana wholesalers were capable of compet-
ing but for United Brands' discriminatory pricing, it inferred that the
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1491, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 589 (1976) (where the Court overturned the Com-
mission's finding of an article 85 violation because the Commission failed to set forth facts to show
that a small amount of intrastate trade affected by the agreement could have had an impact on
trade between Member States).
43 See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon Gesellshaft GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH,
[1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631 (1971).
44 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
45 It is difficult to determine the validity of the Court's assumption since all trade in United
Brands' bananas was precluded by the resale prohibition.
46 GEORGE & JOLL, supra note 2, at 154.
47 Lang, supra note 23.
48 See note 33 supra.
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disadvantaged wholesalers suffered a competitive harm because of the
price discrimination. Having found the competitive injury necessary
for an article 86(c) abuse, the Court could easily presume the requisite
effect on trade.
To an economist a finding of competitive injury sufficient to have
an effect on trade should not be so quickly inferred when different
prices are charged competitors on the basis of a geographic pricing
scheme such as that instituted by United Brands. In cases of discrimi-
nation by location, an in-depth study of economic impact may be war-
ranted. It cannot be assumed that one who receives a better price
always enjoys a competitive advantage. For example, the customer re-
ceiving the more advantageous terms may face higher transport costs so
that it is in no better position in the market place than the customer
receiving the less advantageous terms.49 But, to members of the EEC,
the goal of a "common market" necessitates greater vigilance in pro-
tecting free movement of goods between the Member States.50 There-
fore, it seems that the Court of Justice is more likely to dispense with
any express inquiry into "effect" when the discrimination appears to
segment the market along national borders. The Court may have
meant to establish a rule against discriminations which have no objec-
tive justification and have the effect of segmenting markets along na-
tional boundaries even when competitive harm is not demonstrated.
Such a rule could preclude some pricing practices which do not place
customers at a competitive disadvantage.5' On the other hand, it would
tend to foster a system in which national borders are not in any way
barriers to trade-a result which is congruent with EEC competition
policy.52
49 See RowE, supra note 33, at 180-81.
50 Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, preamble 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 14.
51 The author acknowledges that a discriminatory pricing scheme may serve to inhibit entry
into the market by those who wish to compete across national boundaries but such a practice
would likely establish a competitive disadvantage and would therefore clearly constitute a viola-
tion of article 86.
52 Jones, .4 Primer on Production and Dominant Positions Under E C. Competition Law, 7
INT'L LAW. 612, 612 (1973). The essential nature of the goal is further explained in EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COMMISSION, ACTION PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNITY FOR THE SEC-
OND STAGE (1962):
The community's objectives could not be attained simply by eliminating the barriers of
trade between the member countries. The opening of the domestic markets and the establish-
ment in the Common Market of conditions similar to those of an internal market might be
held up or even inhibited by means of economic or fiscal legislation, aids, agreements limiting
competition or the improper exploitation of dominant market positions.
Id at 20.
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CONCLUSION
Although it was twenty years before the Court of Justice decided a
case of price discrimination, it made a strong effort to clarify an am-
biguous area of the law when faced with a very blatant case. At a mini-
mum the decision means that an enterprise with a forty percent share
of the market and substantial technical, financial, and organizational
resources, will be found to have abused its dominant position in viola-
tion of article 86 of the Rome Treaty if the firm engages in price dis-
crimination which results in market segmentation along national
borders. Businesses operating or intending to operate within the EEC
may also profitably consider the decision to ascertain the future direc-
tions of the EEC enforcement policy. United Brands displays the tradi-
tional concern for maintaining a common market,53 but the decision
also exemplifies an emerging aggressiveness in protecting competition
in the EEC.5 4
Margaret H. FitzPatrick
53 Article 2 of the Rome Treaty provides:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progres-
sively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated rising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States.
Rome Treaty, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15.
54 Swan, supra note 4, at 416.
